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1. Introduction 
The paper proposes a regulatory mechanism for vertically related industries 
characterized by a fair degree of downstream competition, but by limited scope for 
competition in at least one of the upstream production stages. 
For expositional simplicity, we assume for the rest of the paper that the vertical 
industry is composed of only two sectors, an upstream “bottleneck” sector characterized by 
increasing returns to scale, and a workably competitive downstream sector. Results can be 
easily extended to a more general case. 
We exploit the vertical configuration to design a regulatory system for the industry in 
which downstream firms are required to form a production joint venture to co-own the 
bottleneck. In this bottleneck co-ownership (BC) agreement, the ownership of the input 
provider is shared among the downstream firms, and the ownership share of each 
downstream firm equals its share of purchases in the input market. This mechanism 
possesses a number of desirable properties. 
(1) A single firm operates in the upstream sector, thereby efficiently exploiting 
upstream economies of scale.  
(2) The nature of ownership of the upstream firm extends the downstream competition 
to the upstream sector. Thus, the BC ownership structure provides an alternative form of 
vertical relation, beyond the traditional distinction between vertically integrated and vertically 
disintegrated market structures.2  
(3) The BC mechanism partially internalizes the cost externality due to upstream 
economies of scale by encouraging each downstream firm to “move down” the upstream 
average cost curve.  Indeed, with scale economies any increase in output generates a 
reduction of average cost. Under vertical disintegration and linear input pricing, the input 
price is set before (and independently of) the input quantity decision. The actual output 
decision does not affect the per-unit input price, so that downstream firms do not appropriate 
                                                 
2 Such distinction, and the identification of the optimal vertical structure, have been the subject of extensive research for 
both the unregulated and the regulated sectors. See, for example, Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Lee and Hamilton (1999), and 
Kühn and Vives (1999).  
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the benefit from increasing output.3 Under the BC mechanism, the input pricing and the 
input/output quantity decisions are made simultaneously (hence, the downstream firms’ 
output decisions affect the upstream price). 
(4) The ownership link mitigates the problem of double marginalization (see Spengler 
(1952)) that comes up in the presence of vertically disintegrated imperfectly competitive 
stages of production. 
(5) The informational requirement imposed on the regulator is limited. Following the 
definition in Vickers (1995), the BC mechanism is a form of structural regulation (as opposed 
to conduct regulation). Under structural regulation, the policy maker mandates a market 
structure (in this case, the nature of ownership) within which firms are free to set their 
strategic variables. The policy maker does not intervene directly to set firms' strategic 
variables, or impose constraints on their choices (actions associated with conduct regulation). 
When compared to conduct regulation, structural regulation is less demanding, in 
terms of its informational requirement. Notwithstanding that, the schemes proposed by a 
large part of the literature, namely price and profit regulation, are forms of conduct 
regulation. Their successful implementation is, in general, subject to sufficient knowledge of 
the demand and/or of the cost functions by the regulators (see, for example, Loeb and Magat 
(1979) for the non-Bayesian regulation literature, and Laffont and Tirole (1990), Baron and 
Myerson (1982), and Sappington (1983) for the Bayesian regulator literature. These papers 
explicitly model the informational asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated firm). 
The best known example of this type of structural regulation is due to Demsetz (1968), 
who argues that average cost pricing can be achieved by auctioning the monopoly franchise 
rights, and allocating the right to manage the monopoly to the firm offering to sell the 
product at the lowest price.  As is well known, the outcome of such an “ideal” Demsetz 
auction upstream is equivalent to the standard “second best” result of upstream average cost 
pricing - the most efficient uniform pricing outcome if transfers from other sectors of the 
economy are ruled out (see Spulber, 1989).  This “upstream average cost pricing” (AC) 
                                                 
3 An increase in output in fact generates a decrease in cost for the upstream firm (hence an increase in upstream profit). 
However, since the upstream price is set prior to the input/output purchase decision, the upstream benefit cannot be 
transferred to the downstream firms.   
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mechanism has two parts (i) inputs are delivered to downstream firms at average cost; (ii) 
downstream firms compete à la Cournot.  To preview our main result, we show that the total 
surplus resulting from the BC mechanism proposed here exceeds that resulting from 
application of the AC mechanism. 
Clearly, another natural benchmark consists in the industry second best, i.e., in the 
integrated industry average cost pricing, which would emerge in an “ideal” Demsetz auction 
for the vertically integrated sector. However, in this paper, we do not analyze the integrated 
industry average cost pricing benchmark, as we start from the consideration that 
liberalization of the potentially competitive sectors in vertically related markets is something 
per se desirable for a set of reasons that we do not explicitly model (see, for instance, 
Armstrong and Sappington, 2006, for an extensive discussion).  
Co-ownership arrangements, such as joint ventures, have been analyzed quite 
extensively in the management and in the economics literature. Most of the work has focused 
on horizontal arrangements (see, for example, Bresnahan and Salop, 1986).4  
The management literature (see, for example, Kogut, 1988) explains the emergence of 
joint ventures with three alternative reasons: transaction costs, organizational learning, and 
strategic behavior (in particular, consisting in entry deterrence and hedging against 
uncertainty). This literature models the emergence of endogenous profit-maximizing 
arrangements.  
To our knowledge, the only paper that explicitly models vertical joint ventures is Park 
and Ahn (1999). Their environment is similar to that of our paper, with an upstream 
monopoly owned by the downstream competitors (thereby mitigating the double 
marginalization problem). However, in Park and Ahn, the upstream ownership shares are 
exogenously allocated. Hence, their mechanism, differently than ours, does not feature the 
desirable property of internalization of the cost externality due to upstream economies of 
scale (which crucially depends on the endogenous allocation of the upstream ownership 
shares).  
                                                 
4 See also Boffa and Kiesling (2008) for an analysis of competitive joint ventures with an application to the electricity 
distribution sector. 
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The literature on essential facilities, vertical integration and access pricing is extensive. 
The paper most similar to ours in terms of spirit and methodology is Fjell, Foros and Pal 
(2010). Their analysis deals with the case of a vertically integrated incumbent competing with 
a single downstream entrant to whom it sells access. They compare two access pricing 
regimes: i) “exogenous” access pricing in which the firms are charged a constant access price 
which is set, in equilibrium, to exactly cover the access related expenses of the incumbent; 
and ii) “endogenous” access pricing in which the firms explicitly recognize that the access 
price they face is a decreasing function of total output. Their principle result is that the 
endogenous access pricing rule is superior whenever the incumbent’s upstream and 
downstream divisions are not fully integrated.  
A particularly suitable application for the BC mechanism lies in vertically connected 
network industries in which the network manifests significant economies of scale, while the 
downstream retail sector is reasonably competitive. In the liberalized network markets, the 
BC mechanism could be regarded as a welfare enhancing solution halfway between the two 
currently observed organizational modes: full vertical integration and disintegration. 
Input co-ownership agreements, especially in the form of joint ventures for the 
management of a particular asset, exist and are commonly employed in the real world. 
Spontaneous joint venture arrangements are observed, among other sectors, in 
pharmaceutical research and development, computer memory chip production, and oil 
pipelines: All of these sectors display significant economies of scale, which could potentially 
be exploiting the profitable internalization of scale economies induced by the BC through the 
proportion between upstream ownership shares and share of input purchases.  
In the regulated sectors, forms of co-ownership (or competitive joint ventures) exist, 
for example, in the management of the electricity distribution companies in New Zealand. 
However, the ownership shares are fixed ex ante, and unrelated to the share of input 
purchases. 
The present paper focuses on pricing issues, neglecting the (albeit important) issue of 
investment incentives and scope for product differentiation if the BC mechanism had to be 
implemented.  
5
  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the economic 
environment and the characteristics of the BC arrangement; Section 3 analyzes the model; 
Section 4 shows the performance of the BC in a repeated game framework, where collusive 
behaviors may emerge. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The economic environment  
2.1. The industry structure 
Consider a vertical structure where the upstream sector exhibits increasing returns to 
scale, while the downstream stage is workably competitive. Both productive stages are 
essential for producing the final good. There are N firms that operate downstream.  The 
downward sloping inverse demand curve for the homogeneous final product is given by P(Q). 
For simplicity, assume the upstream firm is a single-product firm that produces 
exclusively for the downstream sector at a cost ( )QC . Each downstream firm employs a fixed 
proportions technology where one unit of upstream input, combined with a given amount of 
additional inputs obtained at a constant marginal cost dc , assumed to be zero in what 
follows, produces one unit of output.5 A one-to-one technology captures well the essence of 
the technological features in many network industries, where one unit of input flowing in the 
network (and bought by the downstream firm) is transferred to the end-users. Let Up  denote 
the input price charged to the downstream sector. 
 
2.2. Ownership rules in the BC mechanism 
The structural regulation imposed by the regulator involves each of the downstream 
firms owning a share of the upstream firm proportional to its share of upstream purchases. 
The fact that the same parties compete downstream, while cooperating in the upstream firm, 
may generate incentives that could lead to inefficient discrimination among downstream 
firms. In order to avoid these potential inefficiencies, the regulator does not allow the 
                                                 
5 For notational simplicity, we assume that the downstream firms are identical.  However, our main result (Proposition 3) 
generalizes to the case of downstream firms having different (constant) marginal costs.  
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upstream firm to price discriminate among  downstream firms.6 An alternative form of 
discrimination against some of the downstream firms, that is sabotage,7 is a severe problem 
when the upstream entity is vertically integrated with one (or some of the) downstream 
firm(s). In the co-ownership scheme, the upstream entity can be regarded as being vertically 
integrated with all of the downstream companies; this gives each downstream firm some 
control on the upstream activity, thereby reducing the potential for sabotage.  
 
3. Analysis of the model 
We first characterize the equilibrium output under the AC mechanism: i.e., under 
upstream average cost pricing, followed by downstream oligopolistic competition.  Given the 
input price pU, the input demand by the downstream industry is determined by the Cournot 
Nash equilibrium of the firms’ rivalry in the final product market.8  Therefore, we begin with: 
 
Assumption 1:  (i) There exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for all positive pU.  (ii)  The 
equilibrium is unique when pU is sufficiently low so that firms produce positive outputs in 
equilibrium.  (iii)  This unique equilibrium is “well-behaved” in the sense that the equilibrium 
industry quantity of input (and output) is decreasing in pU.   
  
Parts (i) and (ii) require only minor regularity conditions on the market inverse demand 
function.  Although part (iii) involves a substantive regularity condition, it is quite plausible.  It 
merely requires that the derived inverse demand function for the upstream input be 
downward sloping. 
                                                 
6 For the main results of the paper to apply (i.e., Proposition 3), it is sufficient to assume that all the firms involved in the 
co-ownership observe the cost function, and the court in charge for the enforcement of the rules observe the transfer price, 
Up , ensuring that it is non-discriminatory across the downstream firms.  
7 In the context of a vertical structure, sabotage is usually defined as an action taken by the upstream entity (assumed to 
have some degree of market power) aimed at increasing the cost of one or more of the downstream competitors, without 
raising upstream revenue. While sabotage is a source of productive inefficiencies, it may prove profit-maximizing when the 
upstream firm is vertically integrated with one of the downstream competitors, and the access price is regulated. In such 
cases, the integrated company extracts profits by increasing its downstream division’s market share, as a result of the extra 
costs imposed to its competitors (see, for example, Beard, Kaserman and Mayo, 2001). 
8 The assumptions of the game are not stated in terms of supermodularity, as in the Cournot-type games we analyze, the 
players’ decisions are strategic substitutes; therefore, supermodularity does not apply directly. We therefore decided to use 
the traditional Cournot model; Vives (1999) contains an accessible collection of results on Cournot models. 
7
  
 
In equilibrium, each individual downstream firm chooses its quantity qi  by solving the 
following maximization problem: 
( ) ∑
≠
−−− −=≡−+=
ij
ijiiUiiiiiiq
qQqQqpQqPqQq
i
;),(maxπ   
For each firm, the First Order Necessary Condition for an interior optimum is given by: 
(1) ( ) 0)(' =−+=∂
∂
Ui
i
i pQPQPq
q
π  
Summing equation (1) over all N firms yields: 
(2) ( ) ( ) 0)](['),;( =−+≡ UU pQPNQQPNpQx  
Equation (2) characterizes equilibrium (upstream and downstream) industry output as 
an implicit function of the input price and the number of firms. 
 Next, we give content to Assumption 1(iii) by performing comparative statics analysis 
on equation (2).  By the Implicit Function Theorem: 
(3) ( )ACACACQpU
AC
QPNQPQ
N
x
x
p
Q U
′++′′=−=∂
∂
)1()(
 
Thus a necessary and sufficient condition for Assumption 1(iii) to be satisfied is xQ(QAC) 
< 0. 
Recall that the AC mechanism is one of upstream average cost pricing.  This requires 
us to characterize the lowest intersection between the derived inverse demand curve 
)()(
1
QQQP ACU
−≡  and the decreasing average cost curve AC(Q) of the upstream enterprise.  
Therefore, we need 
 
Assumption 2:  Define ( ) )}(|{max QACQPQQ UQAC ≥= .  We assume that this solution 
exits, is unique and strictly positive.  
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We are now in a position to complete the characterization of QAC, the output resulting 
from the AC mechanism.  Substituting the price equals average cost condition pU = AC(QAC) 
into equation (2) yields the equilibrium condition 
(4) ( ) ( ) 0)](['),( =−+≡ ACACACACAC QACQPNQPQNQz  
We cannot guarantee that there is a unique solution to this equation, as it will be 
satisfied by any intersection of AC(Q) and the derived demand curve for the input.  However, 
if there are multiple intersections, the AC mechanism (and the idealized Demsetz auction) will 
select the one with the greatest Q.  Clearly, it must be the case that the demand curve cuts 
the average cost curve from above at QAC.   That is, it is required that: 
( ) )()1()(1)( ACACACAC
U
AC
ACU
QCA
N
QPNQPQ
p
QQ
QP ′≤′++′′=
∂
∂=∂
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Or equivalently 
(5) ( ) 0),()()1()( ≤=′−′++′′ NQzQCNAQPNQPQ ACQACACACAC  
Thus, we have established the following result: 
 
Proposition 1:  Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the outcome of the AC mechanism, QAC, is 
such that z(QAC) = 0 and zQ(QAC) ≤0. 
 
We now characterize the equilibrium output under the BC mechanism. 
Each firm’s profits are given by: 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) )]([)( QACQPqQCQp
qp
qpqpQPq iU
j
jU
iU
iUi
BC
i −=−⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+−= ∑π   
By inspecting the profit function, one can observe that the transfer price (as long as it 
is non-discriminatory across all the firms) is irrelevant in the final outcome. The single 
(relevant) task for the BC manager is cost-minimization, something in the interest of each of 
9
  
 
the shareholders of the BC. Leaving aside issues of sabotage, this eliminates a potentially 
important source of conflicts of interest within the co-ownership. In such an arrangement, 
individual shareholders have little incentives to try to capture the firm operator, whose control 
is therefore relatively simple.9 
In equilibrium, the First Order Necessary Condition for an interior optimum for each 
firm is given by: 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0]''[ =−+−=∂
∂ QACQPQACQPq
q ii
BC
iπ  
By aggregation, one obtains a condition characterizing any interior Nash equilibrium 
outcome (QBC > 0) resulting from the application of the BC mechanism: 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'][');( =−−+≡ BCBCBCBCBCBCBC QACQQACQPNQPQNQξ                
Since the BC mechanism involves the Nash equilibrium of a game, we need to 
guarantee that said equilibrium is well-defined.  This is accomplished through: 
 
Assumption 3:  (i) There exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the BC game resulting in 
a strictly positive industry output.  (ii)  The equilibrium is “well-behaved” in the sense that 
equilibrium industry output is a strictly increasing function of the number of firms. 
 
The game underlying the BC mechanism is not the standard Cournot oligopoly model. 
However, it does share an important special structure with the Cournot model: the Best 
Replies of each player depend only upon the aggregate choices of its rivals, Q-i.  In the 
present context, the assumption that the demand curve is steeper than the average cost 
curve is sufficient (but not necessary) for uniqueness.10 
                                                 
9 This is especially true in industries where the product quality has only minor variations, such as, for example, electricity 
transmission and distribution, as well as gas or water transportation. Of course, this does not preclude the need for an 
appropriate governance structure of the BC, disciplining the interactions among the shareholders and between them and its 
operator. 
10 See Vives (1999), pages 42-44, for a discussion of existence and uniqueness results for this class of games. 
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Assumption 3(ii) is clearly more restrictive, but seems to be a minimum requirement for 
a well-behaved equilibrium system.  Its import can be characterized by using equation (8) to 
perform comparative statics analysis on QBC with respect to N:  
(9) ( ) ( )( ) 0)]()()[1()]([),( ),( >′−′++′′−′′ −−=−=∂∂ BCBCBCBCBC
BCBC
BC
Q
BC
N
BC
QCAQPNQCAQPQ
QACQP
NQ
NQ
N
Q
ξ
ξ  
The numerator of equation (9) is equal to the unit profit (margin) that would be earned 
by a hypothetical vertically integrated monopolist if the monopolist produced QBC.  This term 
must clearly be positive at any quantity at which total industry profits are positive.  Thus, in 
order for Assumption 3(ii) to be satisfied, the denominator, ξQ, must be negative.11  We have 
thus established the following result:  
 
Proposition 2:  Given Assumption 3, the outcome, QBC  > 0, of the BC mechanism 
satisfies the following conditions: ξ(QBC,N) = 0 and ξQ(QBC,N) < 0. 
 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 have provided the necessary characterizations of the 
market outcomes under the AC mechanism and BC mechanism. In order to be able to 
establish our main result, however, we also need: 
 
Assumption 4: Equation 8 has no roots for  Q > QBC.12  
 
We are now in a position to establish our main result: 
 
Proposition 3:  Given Assumptions 1-4, the BC mechanism results in a greater industry 
output than the AC mechanism: i.e., QBC > QAC. 
                                                 
11 The positivity of the numerator and equation (7), the FONC for the firm optimization problem, establishes that, at 
equilibrium, the second term in denominator is negative: i.e., the demand curve must (locally) be steeper than the average 
cost curve.  Therefore, the additional regularity condition that, at the equilibrium output, P″ (Q)< AC″(Q), would suffice for 
the weak negativity of ξQ. 
12 Sufficient conditions for Assumption 4 to hold are that, for BCQQ ≥ : i) ( ) )(QCAQP ′′<′′  and  ii) 
′ P (Q) < A ′ C (Q) . We thank a refereed for suggesting us this way of stating Assumption 4. 
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Proof:  We begin by establishing a relationship between the equations characterizing 
market outcomes under the two mechanisms. Subtracting equation (4) from equation (8) 
yields 
(10) ( ) 0'),(),( >−=− QQACNQzNQξ  
Thus, ξ(Q) lies everywhere above z(Q).  By Proposition 1, z(Q) cuts the Q axis from 
above at QAC.  From equation (10), ξ(QAC) > 0.  By Assumptions 3(i) and 4, ξ intersects the Q 
axis only once in the relevant direction, at QBC.  By Proposition 2, ξ is decreasing in Q.  
Therefore, QBC > QAC.  Q.E.D. 
 
Our result is illustrated by the following graph:13 
 
ξ(Q)
z(Q)
QAC QBC
 
We now show that total surplus under the BC mechanism exceeds total surplus under 
the AC mechanism. To do this, we use Assumption 5 - a standard regularity condition that 
guarantees total surplus to have a maximum.  
                                                 
13 The graph is drawn using: N=2, C(Q)=F=0.1,  P(Q) = 1 – Q. 
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Assumption 5: The demand function is steeper than the upstream marginal cost 
function, when the latter is decreasing, that is: ( ) ( )QCQP ''' <           
                                                                    
Proposition 4:  Given Assumptions 1-5, aggregate total surplus in the upstream and the 
downstream markets is higher under the BC arrangement than under AC. 
 
Proof: Aggregate total surplus in the upstream and the downstream markets is defined 
as: 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( )QCdssPQTS Q −= ∫
0
                                
Assumption 5 ensures concavity of (11).  
The total surplus maximizing output Q* satisfies the first order necessary conditions for 
maximization: 
(12) ( ) ( )*'* QCQP = . 
Observe that, since ( ) 0' <QAC : 
(13) ( ) ( )** QACQP <    
Equation (13) shows that the total industry profit at the total surplus maximizing 
output level is negative. This implies that BCQ  and ACQ  lie both below Q*. Further, the 
concavity of (11) ensures that total surplus is increasing for *QQ ≤ . 
Finally, Proposition 3 shows that ACBC QQ > . Hence, ( ) ( )ACBC QTSQTS > .  
Q.E.D. 
 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Under BC firms (partially) internalize 
the benefit of upstream economies of scale in the profit function (since each firm's reaction 
function incorporates the impact of its own output decision on the upstream average cost). 
Therefore they end up producing a higher output. On the contrary, under the AC mechanism, 
the input/output quantity decision is taken after the input price decision. As a consequence, 
13
  
 
the actual quantity decision has no effect on the upstream input price. The fixed input price is 
a double-edged sword for the firm. On the one hand, firms exploit it as a commitment device 
to achieve a high price (this effect prevails when the AC mechanism yields a higher output 
than the integrated monopoly structure); on the other hand, firms may be harmed by it 
(when the AC mechanism yields a lower output than the integrated monopoly structure), as 
they are unable to commit to a higher input demand (which would increase their profit, 
through the reduction of average cost). Indeed, once the auction is run and the price is fixed, 
downstream firms have an incentive to restrict their demand regardless of the upstream 
price.  Also, observe that, as intuitively plausible, the second-best result at the industry level, 
i.e., vertically integrated average cost pricing, yields a higher output than the BC mechanism 
(In such a mechanism, however, we would miss all the benefits, not modeled here, emerging 
from the liberalization of the downstream sector).As a result of the higher output, total 
surplus in the BC mechanism exceeds that of the AC mechanism. The standard intuition that, 
in association with lower output, the larger producers’ surplus is offset by the smaller 
consumers’ surplus, applies in the present case as well. 
  
                                                                           
4. Collusive behaviors 
This section analyzes the collusive potential of the bottleneck co-ownership as compared to 
the AC mechanism.  
Determining which of the two mechanisms is more conducive to collusion is relevant for 
qualifying the welfare analysis. The sources of collusion in the two games differ both because 
of the different structure of the two games under perfect information, and because the two 
games may generate different levels of interaction among firms, thereby leading to possibly 
different informational structures across them.  
This paragraph elaborates on the collusive potential of the AC and BC games under 
perfect information, and discusses about the possible effects of the different level of 
interactions among firms in the two games at the end of the Section.  
14
  
 
By adopting the repeated game model classically used to study tacit collusion (see 
Friedman, 1971), we show that in fact which of the two mechanisms is more likely to lead to 
collusive outcomes depends on the parameters of the model. 
Consider an infinitely repeated game characterized by Cournot reversion strategies. 
Under both regimes, the individual rationality constraint for the sustainability of collusion 
prescribes: 
(14)  δ
δππδ
π
−+≥− 11
cour
jdev
j
coll
j
                                                           
For collusion to be feasible, the discounted monopoly profit must exceed the sum of 
the one-shot deviation profit and the continuation profit (where the continuation profit is the 
static game profit, that is Cournot). 
By inspecting (14), one can observe at first that colljπ  is unchanged across the two 
regimes. The industry profit under a collusive agreement corresponds in both cases to the 
profit accrued to a hypothetical vertically integrated monopolist. On the contrary, both profits 
of continuation courjπ  and from deviation devjπ  may vary. The role of the continuation profit is 
crucial. Considering a linear example, with P(Q) = 1 – Q, N = 2, C(Q) = F, there exists a critical 
value of the fixed cost ( 1547.013
3
2 =−=F ) above which co-ownership is more profitable 
than AC when static quantity competition is played.  
The one-shot profit from deviation is higher under BC, due to the beneficial 
internalization of the reduction in average cost. Hence, the deviation profit contributes to 
making collusion less likely under BC, thereby lowering the critical fixed cost value above 
which BC decreases the likelihood of collusion.  
As a result, when, in our example, 25.0125.0 ≤< F ,14 BC is less collusive than AC, while 
for 125.0<F  the opposite is the case. Therefore, holding the number of firms fixed, when 
                                                 
14 Notice that for F > 0.25, there is no production, as even the integrated monopoly would incur a loss if he decided to 
produce. 
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economies of scale are significant (in our example, when F is relatively high), BC is welfare-
superior to AC even in a repeated game setting.  
The analysis on collusion has been carried out under the assumption of perfect information 
(including perfect monitoring of upstream cost and rivals’ output); however, we recognize 
that, if we abandoned it, we could envision situations in which the BC arrangement, by 
expanding the scope for interaction among firms, may facilitate the formation of cartels, as 
well as their success, thanks to a better on the rivals’ cost structures, leading to an easier 
monitoring of the possible deviations. While this notion cannot be straightforwardly analyzed 
within a formal model, it should certainly be regarded as a crucial empirical issue. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The previous literature, which has focused on static models of efficiency of vertical 
industries, has shown that vertical integration may be beneficial because firms’ decisions not 
being simultaneous brings about two kinds of problems: 
i) double marginalization; 
ii) a cost externality when returns on scale are not constant. 
An important drawback of vertical integration is that in vertical structures characterized 
by different degrees of potential competition the least competitive sector may employ a 
variety of methods (including contractual arrangements) to extend its market power to the 
full production chain, thereby harming competition in the industry. 
This paper describes an input co-ownership mechanism characterized by a form of 
vertical integration that fosters the competition (observed in the most competitive sector) 
across all the various vertically related sectors involved in production.  In terms of social 
welfare, the mechanism tends to perform better than vertical integration (as it allows 
competition between a number of firms equal to the number of firms in the most competitive 
sector), and better  than full vertical disintegration (since it avoids the emergence of double 
marginalization).  It also performs better than upstream average cost pricing followed by 
downstream competition, as in the BC, differently than in the AC, firms partially internalize 
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the benefit (in terms of average cost reduction) associated with an upstream output increase. 
Furthermore, when economies of scale are significant, the BC arrangement increases firms’ 
profit with respect to AC. In the context of a repeated game, this makes a deviation from a 
collusive agreement more attractive under BC, thereby comparatively reducing its collusive 
potential.  
Finally, the BC mechanism, given our setting, is clearly not a first-best mechanism. It is 
welfare-dominated by a number of alternative arrangements, including vertically integrated 
average-cost pricing (with respect to which our mechanism possesses some non-model 
advantages, such as the instauration of competition whenever economically feasible), and an 
average-cost-regulated upstream two-part tariff.15 However, an average-cost-regulated 
upstream two-part tariff imposes a relevant informational load on the regulator. In addition, 
while the result that BC increases output over AC generalizes to downstream firms with 
heterogeneous marginal costs, the efficiency result of the average-cost-regulated upstream 
two-part tariff does not.  
 
                                                 
15 We thank a referee for pointing this out. 
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